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ABSTRACT
Secure Symmetrical Multilevel Diversity Coding. (May 2012)
Shuo Li, B.S., Xi’an Jiaotong University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Tie Liu
Secure symmetrical multilevel diversity coding (S-SMDC) is a source coding
problem, where a total of L − N discrete memoryless sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) are to
be encoded by a total of L encoders. This thesis considers a natural generalization
of SMDC to the secure communication setting with an additional eavesdropper. In
a general S-SMDC system, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper have access
to a subset U and A of the encoder outputs, respectively. Which subsets U and A
will materialize are unknown a priori at the encoders. No matter which subsets U
and A actually occur, the sources (S1, . . . , Sk) need to be perfectly reconstructable
at the legitimate receiver whenever |U | = N + k, and all sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) need
to be kept perfectly secure from the eavesdropper as long as |A| ≤ N . A precise
characterization of the entire admissible rate region is established via a connection to
the problem of secure coding over a three-layer wiretap network and utilizing some
properties of basic polyhedral structure of the admissible rate region. Building on
this result, it is then shown that superposition coding remains optimal in terms of
achieving the minimum sum rate for the general secure SMDC problem.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Symmetrical Multilevel Diversity Coding
Symmetrical Multilevel Diversity Coding (SMDC) system consists with L indepen-
dent discrete memoryless sources (S1, . . . , SL), where the importance of the sources
is assumed to decrease with the subscript l. The sources are to be encoded by a
total of L encoders, where the rate of the lth encoder output is Rl. The decoder
can access a subset U ⊆ ΩL := {1, . . . , L} of the encoder outputs. Which subset of
the encoder outputs is available at the decoder is unknown a priori at the encoders.
However, no matter which subset U actually realizes, the sources (S1, . . . , Sm) need
to be asymptotically perfectly reconstructed at the decoder whenever |U | ≥ m. Note
that the word “symmetrical” here refers to the fact that the sources that need to be
reconstructed at the decoder depend on the available subset of the encoder outputs
only via its cardinality. The rate allocations at different encoders, however, can be
different and are not necessarily symmetrical.
The problem of Multilevel Diversity Coding (MDC) was introduced by Roche [1]
and Yeung [2] in the early 1990s. In particular, [2] considered the simple coding strat-
egy of separately encoding different sources at the encoders, subsequently referred to
as superposition coding. The aforementioned SMDC problem was first systematically
studied in [3], where it was shown that superposition coding can achieve the minimum
sum rate for the general SMDC problem (with an arbitrary total number of encoders
L) and the entire admissible rate region with L = 3 encoders. The problem regarding
This thesis follows the style of IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2whether superposition coding can achieve the entire admissible rate region for the
general SMDC problem, however, remained open. Finally, in a very elegant (albeit
highly technical) paper [4], Yeung and Zhang resolved the open problem by positive
through the so-called α-resolution method.
Recent years have seen a flurry of research on information-theoretic security.
See [5] and [6] for surveys of recent progress in this field. Motivated by this renewed
interest, in this thesis I consider the problem of Secure Symmetrical Multilevel Diver-
sity Coding (S-SMDC) in the presence of an additional eavesdropper. Specifically, a
collection of L−N independent discrete memoryless sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) are to be
encoded by a total of L encoders, where the rate of the lth encoder output is Rl. A
legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper can access a subset U ⊆ ΩL and A ⊆ ΩL of
the encoder outputs, respectively. Which subsets of the encoder outputs are available
at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are unknown a priori at the encoders.
However, no matter which subsets U and A actually occur, the sources (S1, . . . , Sk)
need to be asymptotically perfectly reconstructed at the legitimate receiver whenever
|U | ≥ N + k, and the entire collection of the sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) needs to be
kept perfectly secret from the eavesdropper as long as |A| ≤ N . As before, the word
“symmetrical” here refers to the access structure at the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper, but not to the rate allocations at different encoders. We envision that
such a communication scenario is useful for designing distributed information storage
systems [1] where information retrieval needs to be both robust and secure.
As mentioned previously, separate encoding of different sources (superposition
coding) can achieve the entire admissible rate region for the general SMDC problem
without any secrecy constraints [4]. It is thus natural to ask whether the same separate
encoding strategy would remain optimal for the general S-SMDC problems. For the
classical SMDC problems without any secrecy constraints, the problem of efficient
3encoding of individual sources is essentially to transmit the source over an erasure
channel and is well understood based on the earlier work of Singleton [7]. For the
S-SMDC problems, however, the problem of efficient encoding of individual sources
is closely related to the problem of secure coding over a Wiretap Network (WN) [8],
which, in its most general setting, is a very challenging problem in information-
theoretic security.
B. Secure Network Coding on Wiretap Network
Secure Network Coding on Wiretap Network is a information-theoretic security prob-
lem of network coding and was studied by N. Cai and R. W. Yeung in [8]. They
proposed a way to construct a secure linear network code for wiretap network which
was proved to be optimal for the case that the wiretapper may access any subset of
channels of a fixed size.
A wiretap network, denoted as (G, s,U ,A), consists of a directed acyclic multi-
graph G, a source node s, a set of user nodes U , and a collection of sets of wiretapped
edges A. The multigraph G = (V , E) is seen as a network where V is the node set and
E is the edge set. A wiretapper may access on member of A but no more than one. In
order to protect the message generated by the source node from the wiretapper, the
key has to be introduced in the network. A code is admissible for a wiretap network
if the decodable condition and the secure condition are satisfied. A wiretap network
is called r- Wiretap Network if all subsets in A have cardinalities no more than r. A
wiretapper will get no information of the source by accessing no more than r channels
when the admissible r- secure network code applied.
The most common example of the r- Wiretap Network, studied in [9] and [10],
is the so called ’secret sharing’ problem. An (r, n)−threshold secret sharing scheme,
4which is equivalent to an (r − 1)−threshold secret sharing scheme, consists of n
participants such that any r participants can perfectly recover the source message
while any r − 1 or less participants can not acquired any information.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter II, we focus on the
problem of encoding individual sources, i.e., Secure Symmetrical Single-level Diversity
Coding (S-SSDC). By leveraging the results of [8] on secure coding over a three-layer
WN and utilizing some basic polyhedral structure of the admissible rate region, we
provide a precise characterization of the entire admissible rate region for the general
S-SSDC problem. Building on this result, in Chapter III we show that superposition
coding can achieve the minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem. Finally,
in Chapter IV we conclude the thesis with some remarks.
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SECURE SYMMETRICAL SINGLE-LEVEL DIVERSITY CODING
A. Problem Statement
Let {S[t]}∞t=1 be a discrete memoryless source with time index t and let Sn :=
(S[1], . . . , S[n]). An (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem consists of a set of L encoders, a
legitimate receiver who has access to a subset U ⊆ ΩL of the encoder outputs, and
an eavesdropper who has access to a subset A ⊆ ΩL of the encoder outputs. Which
subsets of the encoder outputs are available at the legitimate receiver and the eaves-
dropper are unknown a priori at the encoders. However, no matter which subsets U
and A actually occur, the legitimate receiver must be able to asymptotically perfectly
reconstruct the source whenever |U | ≥ m, and the source must be kept perfectly secret
from the eavesdropper as long as |A| ≤ N . Obviously, reliable and secure communi-
cation of the source is possible only when m > N .
Formally, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code is defined by a collection of L encoding
functions
el : Sn ×K → {1, . . . ,Ml}, ∀l = 1, . . . , L (2.1)
and decoding functions
dU :
∏
l∈U
{1, . . . ,Ml} → Sn, ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ m. (2.2)
Here, K denotes the key space accessible to all L encoders. There are no limitations
on the size of the key space K. However, the secret key is only shared by the encoders,
but not with the legitimate receiver or the eavesdropper. A nonnegative rate tuple
(R1, . . . , RL) is said to be admissible if for every  > 0, there exits, for sufficiently
large block length n, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code such that:
6• (Rate constraints)
1
n
logMl ≤ Rl + , ∀l = 1, . . . , L; (2.3)
• (Asymptotically perfect reconstruction at the legitimate receiver)
Pr{dU(XU) 6= Sn} ≤ , ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ m (2.4)
where Xl := el(S
n, K) is the output of the lth encoder, K is the secret key
shared by all L encoders, and XU := {Xl : l ∈ U}; and
• (Perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper)
H(Sn|XA) = H(Sn), ∀A ⊆ ΩL s.t. |A| ≤ N (2.5)
i.e., observing the encoder outputs XA does not provide any information re-
garding to the source sequence Sn.
The admissible rate region R is the collection of all admissible rate tuples
(R1, . . . , RL). The minimum sum rate Rms is defined as
Rms := min
(R1,...,RL)∈R
L∑
l=1
Rl. (2.6)
B. Main Results
The following lemma provides a simple outer bound on the admissible rate region of
the general S-SSDC problem. Let R(L, k,H) be the collection of all nonnegative rate
tuples (R1, . . . , RL) satisfying
∑
l∈D
Rl ≥ H, ∀D ∈ Ω(k)L (2.7)
where Ω
(k)
L is the collection of all subsets of ΩL of size k.
7Lemma 1. For any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the admissible rate region
R ⊆ R(L,m−N,H(S)). (2.8)
Lemma 1 can be proved using standard information-theoretic techniques. For
completeness, a proof is included in Appendix A. The above outer bound is known
to be tight in the following two special cases:
1) When N = 0, the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem reduces to the classical (L,m)
SSDC problem without any secrecy constraints, for which the admissible rate
region is known [7] to be R(L,m,H(S)).
2) With N > 0 but m = N + 1, a collection D of the encoder outputs will
either lead to an asymptotically perfect reconstruction of the source (whenever
|D| ≥ N+1), or provide zero information on the source (whenever |D| ≤ N). In
this case, the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem reduces to the classical (L,N) threshold
secret sharing problem, for which the admissible rate region is known [9,10] to
be R(L, 1, H(S)).
The main result of this section is that the outer bound R(L,m − N,H(S)) is
in fact the admissible rate region for the general S-SSDC problem, as summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the admissible rate region
R = R(L,m−N,H(S)). (2.9)
A proof of the theorem is provided in Sec. C. To show that every rate tuple
in R(L,m − N,H(S)) is admissible, our proof proceeds in the following two steps.
First, we show that for any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the symmetrical rate tuple
8(H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N)) is admissible. In our proof, this is accomplished
by relating the S-SSDC problem to the problem of secure coding over a three-layer
WN and using the result of [8, Th. 3] on an achievable secrecy rate for the generic
WN. Building on the previous result, next we show that every rate tuple in R(L,m−
N,H(S)) is admissible via an induction argument (inducting on the total number of
encoders L) and the following polyhedral structure of R(L, k,H).
Proposition 1. R(L, k,H) is a pointed polyhedron in RL with the following structural
properties:
1) The characteristic cone of R(L, k,H) is given by {(R1, . . . , RL) : Rl ≥ 0, ∀l =
1, . . . , L}.
2) Among all corner points (vertices) of R(L, k,H), (H/k, . . . , H/k) is the only
one with all strictly positive entries (if there exists any).
3) For any l = 1, . . . , L, the Rl = 0 slice of R(L, k,H) is isomorphic to R(L −
1, k− 1, H). In particular, the RL = 0 slice of R(L, k,H) is identical to R(L−
1, k − 1, H), i.e.,
{(R1, . . . , RL−1) : (R1, . . . , RL−1, 0) ∈ R(L, k,H)} = R(L−1, k−1, H). (2.10)
Proof. Property 1 follows directly from the definition of characteristic cone [11, Lec. 2].
Property 2 is due to the fact that
(R1, . . . , RL) = (H/k, . . . , H/k) (2.11)
is a solution to the equations
∑
l∈D
Rl = H, ∀D ∈ Ω(k)L . (2.12)
To see property 3, note that the Rl = 0 slice of R(L, k,H) is given by all
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(a) R(2, 1, H)
R1
R2
R3
(H,H, 0)
(H, 0, H)
(0, H,H)
(
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H
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,
H
2
)
(b) R(3, 1, H)
Fig. 1. Illustration of the rate region R(L, k,H) for (a) L = 2 and (b)L = 2. The
Rl = 0 slices of R(3, 1, H) are empty sets, and the Rl = 0 slices of R(3, 2, H)
are isomorphic to R(2, 1, H).
nonnegative rate tuples (R1, . . . , Rl−1, Rl+1, . . . , RL) satisfying
∑
d∈D
Rd ≥ H, ∀D ∈ Ω(k−1)L\{l} ∪ Ω(k)L\{l} (2.13)
where Ω
(k)
L\{l} denotes all subsets of ΩL \ {l} of size k. Since every inequality with
D ∈ Ω(k)L\{l} is dominated by every inequality with D′ ∈ Ω(k−1)L\{l} and such that D′ ⊆ D,
we have the desired property.
Fig. 1 illustrates the above polyhedral structure of R(L, k,H) for L = 2 and 3.
The following corollary summarizes the minimum sum rate for the general S-SSDC
problem.
Corollary 2. For any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the minimum sum rate
Rms =
L
m−NH(S). (2.14)
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Proof. Let us first verify that
min
(R1,...,RL)∈R(L,k,H)
L∑
l=1
Rl =
L
k
H. (2.15)
For any rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) ∈ R(L, k,H), we have
∑
l∈D
Rl ≥ H, ∀D ∈ Ω(k)L . (2.16)
Summing over all D ∈ Ω(k)L gives
∑
D∈Ω(k)L
∑
l∈D
Rl =
 L− 1
k − 1
 L∑
l=1
Rl ≥
 L
k
H. (2.17)
We thus have
L∑
l=1
Rl ≥
 L
k

 L− 1
k − 1

H =
L
k
H (2.18)
for any rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) ∈ R(L, k,H). On the other hand, note that the
symmetrical rate tuple
(H/k, . . . , H/k) ∈ R(L, k,H) (2.19)
so
min
(R1,...,RL)∈R(L,k,H)
L∑
l=1
Rl ≤ L
k
H. (2.20)
Combining (2.18) and (2.20) completes the proof of (2.15).
Now by Theorem 1,
Rms = min
(R1,...,RL)∈R
L∑
l=1
Rl = min
(R1,...,RL)∈R(L,m−N,H(S))
L∑
l=1
Rl =
L
m−NH(S). (2.21)
This completes the proof of the corollary.
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C. Proof of Theorem 1
Let us first show that the symmetrical rate tuple (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))
is admissible by considering the following simple source-channel separation scheme
for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem:
• First compress the source sequence Sn into a source message W using a fixed-
length lossless source code. It is well known [12, Ch. 3.2] that the rate R of the
source message W can be made arbitrarily close to the entropy rate H(S) for
sufficiently large block length n.
• Next, the source message W is delivered to the legitimate receiver using a secure
(L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL))
WN code.
The problem of secure coding over a WN was formally introduced in [8]. A
generic WN (G, s,U ,A) consists of a directed acyclic network G, a source node s, a
set of user nodes U , and a collection of sets of wiretapped edges A. Each member of A
may be fully accessed by an eavesdropper, but no eavesdropper may access more than
one member of A. The source node has access to a message W , which is intended for
all user nodes in U but needs to be kept perfectly secret from the eavesdroppers. The
maximum achievable secrecy rate for W is called the secrecy capacity of the WN and
is denoted by Cs(G, s,U ,A).
An (L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) WN is a special WN with three layers of nodes: top,
middle, and bottom. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the only node in the top layer is the
source node s. There are L intermediate nodes in the middle layer, each corresponding
to an encoder in the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem. For each l = 1, . . . , L, the source
12
s
1 2 L− 1 L
u1 u|U|
. . .
. . . . . .
H
m−N
H
m−N
H
m−N
H
m−N
Fig. 2. Illustration of the (L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) WN.
node s is connected to the intermediate node l by a channel (s, l) with capacity Rl.
There are
|U| =
 L
m
 (2.22)
user nodes in the bottom layer, each corresponding to a possible realization of the
legitimate receiver in the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem and is connected to m interme-
diate nodes through m infinite-capacity channels. Finally, the collection of sets of
wiretapped edges A is defined as
A :=
{
{(s, l)|l ∈ A} : A ∈ Ω(N)L
}
(2.23)
where each set of wiretapped edges in A corresponds to a possible realization of the
eavesdropper in the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem.
Based on the aforementioned connection between the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem
and the problem of secure coding over the (L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) WN, we have the
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following simple lemma.
Lemma 2. A nonnegative rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) is admissible for the (L,N,m) S-
SSDC problem if the entropy rate of the source is less than or equal to the secrecy
capacity of the (L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) WN, i.e.,
H(S) ≤ Cs(L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)). (2.24)
In general, characterizing the exact secrecy capacity of a WN can be very difficult.
For a generic WN (G, s,U ,A), the following secrecy rate
Rs = min
u∈U ,A∈A
[mincut(s, u)−mincut(s, A)] (2.25)
is known [8] to be achievable. Here, mincut(s, u) denotes the value of a minimum
cut between the source node s and the user node u, and mincut(s, A) denotes the
value of a minimum cut between the source node s and the set of wiretapped edges
A. For the (L,N,m, (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))) WN, it is straightforward
to verify that
mincut(s, u) =
m
m−NH(S), ∀u ∈ U (2.26)
and
mincut(s, A) =
N
m−NH(S), ∀A ∈ A. (2.27)
Hence, the secrecy rate
Rs =
m
m−NH(S)−
N
m−NH(S) = H(S) (2.28)
is achievable for the (L,N,m, (H(S)/(m − N), . . . , H(S)/(m − N))) WN. We sum-
marize this result in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For any (L,N,m, (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))) WN, the secrecy
14
capacity can be bounded from below as
Cs(L,N,m, (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))) ≥ H(S). (2.29)
Combining Lemmas 2 and 3 proves the admissibility of the symmetrical rate
tuple
(H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N)) .
Building on the previous result, next we show that every rate tuple in R(L,m−
N,H(S)) is admissible. By Proposition 1, R(L,m−N,H(S)) is a pointed polyhedron
with the characteristic cone given by {(R1, . . . , RL) : Rl ≥ 0, ∀l = 1, . . . , L}. Thus,
to show that all rate tuples in R(L,m − N,H(S)) are admissible, it is sufficient to
show that all corner points of R(L,m−N,H(S)) are admissible.
We shall consider proof by induction, where the induction is on the total number
of encoders L. First consider the base case with L = 2. When L = 2, there is only
one nontrivial (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem: the (2, 1, 2) S-SSDC problem. Note that
the rate region R(2, 1, H(S)) has only one corner point: the symmetrical rate pair
(H(S), H(S)), whose admissibility has already been established. We thus conclude
that every rate tuple in R(2, 1, H(S)) is admissible for the (2, 1, 2) S-SSDC problem.
Now assume that for every nontrivial (L − 1, N ′,m′) S-SSDC problem, all rate
tuples in R(L′,m′ − N ′, H(S)) are admissible. Based on this assumption, next we
show that all corner points of R(L,m − N,H(S)) are admissible for the (L,N,m)
S-SSDC problem. We shall consider the corner points with all strictly positive entries
(it they exist) and those with at least one zero entry separately:
1) By Proposition 1, the symmetrical rate tuple (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−
N)) is the only corner point of R(L,m − N,H(S)) with all strictly positive
entries (if it exists), whose admissibility has already been established.
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2) To prove the admissibility of the corner points of R(L,m − N,H(S)) with at
least one zero entry, by the symmetry of the rate region R(L,m − N,H(S))
we may consider without loss of generality those with RL = 0. Note that if an
(n, (M1, . . . ,ML−1)) code satisfies both asymptotically perfect reconstruction
constraint (2.4) and the perfect secrecy constraint (2.5) for the (L− 1, N,m−
1) S-SSDC problem, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML−1, 1)) code with the same encoding
functions for encoders 1 to L− 1 (encoder L uses a constant encoding function)
also satisfies (trivially) both constraints for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem.
Thus, if (R1, . . . , RL−1) is an admissible rate tuple for the (L − 1, N,m − 1)
S-SSDC problem, then (R1, . . . , RL−1, 0) is also an admissible rate tuple for the
(L,N,m) S-SSDC problem. By the induction assumption, all rate tuples in
R(L − 1,m − N − 1, H(S)) are admissible for the (L − 1, N,m − 1) problem.
Combined with Proposition 1, this implies that all rate tuples in
{(R1, . . . , RL−1, 0) : (R1, . . . , RL−1) ∈ R(L− 1,m−N − 1, H(S))}
= {(R1, . . . , RL) ∈ R(L,m−N,H(S)) : RL = 0}
(2.30)
i.e., the RL = 0 slice of R(L,m − N,H(S)), are admissible for the (L,N,m)
S-SSDC problem. As a special case, all corner points of R(L,m − N,H(S))
with RL = 0 are admissible for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem.
Combining Steps 1 and 2 proves that all corner points of R(L,m − N,H(S))
are admissible. We thus conclude that all rate tuples in R(L,m − N,H(S)) are
admissible. This completes the induction step and hence the proof of the theorem.
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CHAPTER III
SECURE SYMMETRICAL MULTILEVEL DIVERSITY
CODING
A. Problem Statement
Let {S1[t], . . . , SL−N [t]}∞t=1 be a collection of L−N independent discrete memoryless
sources with time index t and let Snk := (Sk[1], . . . , Sk[n]). An (L,N) S-SMDC prob-
lem consists of a set of L encoders, a legitimate receiver who has access to a subset U
of the encoder outputs, and an eavesdropper who has access to a subset A of the en-
coder outputs. Which subsets of the encoder outputs are available at the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper are unknown a priori at the encoders. However, no
matter which subsets U and A actually occur, the legitimate receiver must be able to
asymptotically perfectly reconstruct the sources (S1, . . . , Sk) whenever |U | = N + k,
and all sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) must be kept perfectly secure from the eavesdropper
as long as |A| ≤ N .
Formally, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code is defined by a collection of L encoding
functions
el :
L−N∏
k=1
Snk ×K → {1, . . . ,Ml}, ∀l = 1, . . . , L (3.1)
and decoding functions
dU :
∏
l∈U
{1, . . . ,Ml} →
|U |−N∏
k=1
Snk , ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ N + 1. (3.2)
Here, K is the key space accessible to all L encoders. A nonnegative rate tuple
(R1, . . . , RL) is said to be admissible if for every  > 0, there exits, for sufficiently
large block length n, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code such that:
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• (Rate constraints)
1
n
logMl ≤ Rl + , ∀l = 1, . . . , L; (3.3)
• (Asymptotically perfect reconstruction at the legitimate receiver)
Pr{dU(XU) 6= (Sn1 , . . . , Sn|U |−N)} ≤ , ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ N + 1 (3.4)
where Xl := el((S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
L−N), K) is the output of the lth encoder, K is the
secret key shared by all L encoders, and XU := {Xl : l ∈ U}; and
• (Perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper)
H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
L−N |XA) = H(Sn1 , . . . , SnL−N), ∀A ⊆ ΩL s.t. |A| ≤ N (3.5)
i.e., observing the encoder outputs XA does not provide any information re-
garding to the source sequences (Sn1 , . . . , S
n
L−N).
B. Main Results
Motivated by the success of [2–4] on the classical SMDC problem without any secrecy
constraints, here we focus on superposition coding where the output of the lth encoder
Xl is given by
Xl =
(
X
(1)
l , . . . , X
(L−N)
l
)
(3.6)
and X
(k)
l is the coded message for source Sk at the lth encoder using an (L,N,N +k)
S-SSDC code. Note here that all sources are encoded separately at the encoders, and
there is no coding across different sources. Thus, if (R
(k)
1 , . . . , R
(k)
L ) is an admissible
rate tuple for the (L,N,N + k) S-SSDC problem with source Sk, then the rate tuple
(R1, . . . , RL) =
(
L−N∑
k=1
R
(k)
1 , . . . ,
L−N∑
k=1
R
(k)
L
)
(3.7)
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is admissible for the (L,N) S-SMDC problem.
By Corollary 2, the minimum sum rate for the (L,N,N + k) S-SSDC problem
with source Sk is given by (L/k)H(Sk). It follows that
∑L−N
k=1 (L/k)H(Sk) is the
minimum sum rate that can be achieved by superposition coding for the (L,N) S-
SMDC problem. The main result of this section is that
∑L−N
k=1 (L/k)H(Sk) is in fact
the minimum sum rate that can be achieved by any coding scheme for the (L,N)
S-SMDC problem. Thus, superposition coding is optimal in terms of achieving the
minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem. We summarize this result in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Superposition coding can achieve the minimum sum rate for the general
(L,N) S-SMDC problem, which is given by
Rms =
L−N∑
k=1
L
k
H(Sk). (3.8)
A proof of the theorem is provided in Sec C. The proof uses an induction
argument and is built on the classical subset inequality of Han [12, Ch. 17.6] and the
following key proposition.
Proposition 2. For any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code that satisfies both asymptotically
perfect reconstruction constraint (3.4) and the perfect secrecy constraint (3.5), we
have
H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) ≥ nH(Sk) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA)− nδk(n, ) (3.9)
where
δk(n, ) := 1/n+ 
k∑
α=1
log |Sα| (3.10)
for any A ∈ Ω(N)L and D ∈ Ω(k)L such that A ∩D = ∅ and any k = 1, . . . , L−N .
19
C. Proof of the Main Results
Let us first prove Proposition 2. Since |A| = N , |D| = k, and A ∩ D = ∅, we have
|D ∪ A| = N + k. For any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code that satisfies both asymptotically
perfect reconstruction constraint (3.4) and the perfect secrecy constraint (3.5), we
have by Fano’s inequality
H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k |XD, XA) ≤ nδk(n, ) (3.11)
and
H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k |XA) = H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk ). (3.12)
Thus,
H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) + nδk(n, )
≥ H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) +H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk |XD, XA) (3.13)
≥ H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) +H(Snk |Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XD, XA) (3.14)
= H(XD, S
n
k |Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) (3.15)
= H(Snk |Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (3.16)
= H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k |XA)−H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1|XA)
+H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (3.17)
= H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k )−H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1|XA)
+H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (3.18)
≥ H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk )−H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (3.19)
= H(Snk |Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (3.20)
= H(Snk ) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (3.21)
= nH(Sk) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (3.22)
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where (3.13) follows from (3.11), (3.18) follows from (3.12), (3.19) follows from the
fact that conditioning reduces entropy, (3.21) follows from the fact that the sources
S1, . . . , Sk are mutually independent, and (3.22) follows from the fact that the source
Sk is memoryless. Moving nδk(n, ) to the right-hand side of the inequality completes
the proof of Proposition 2.
Building on the result of Proposition 2, next let us show that for any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML))
code that satisfies both asymptotically perfect reconstruction constraint (3.4) and the
perfect secrecy constraint (3.5) and any α = 1, . . . , L−N , we have
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) ≥
α∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆α −
α∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ) (3.23)
where
∆α :=
L L
N

 L−N
α

∑
A∈Ω(N)L
∑
D∈Ω(α)
L\A
H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snα, XA)
α
. (3.24)
We shall consider proof by induction, where the induction is on α. First consider
the base case with α = 1. Let A ∈ Ω(N)L and let l ∈ ΩL \ A. Applying Proposition 2
with k = 1, we have
H(Xl) ≥ nH(S1) +H(Xl|Sn1 , XA)− nδ1(n, ). (3.25)
Averaging (3.25) over all l ∈ ΩL \ A and all A ∈ Ω(N)L , we have
1 L
N

 L−N
1

∑
A∈Ω(N)L
∑
l∈ΩL\A
H(Xl) ≥ nH(S1) + 1
L
∆1 − nδ1(n, ). (3.26)
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Note that
1 L
N

 L−N
1

∑
A∈Ω(N)L
∑
l∈ΩL\A
H(Xl) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
H(Xl). (3.27)
We thus have
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) ≥ nLH(S1) + ∆1 − nLδ1(n, ) (3.28)
which completes the proof of the base case.
Now assume that (3.23) holds for α − 1 for some 2 ≤ α ≤ L − N . Based on
this assumption, next we show that (3.23) also holds for α. By the classical subset
inequality of Han [12, Ch. 17.6], for any A ∈ Ω(N)L we have
1
L−N
α− 1

∑
D∈Ω(α−1)
L\A
H(XD|Sn1 ,...,Snα−1,XA)
α−1
≥ 1
L−N
α

∑
D∈Ω(α)
L\A
H(XD|Sn1 ,...,Snα−1,XA)
α
.
(3.29)
It follows that
∆α−1 ≥ L L
N

 L−N
α

∑
A∈Ω(N)L
∑
D∈Ω(α)
L\A
H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snα−1, XA)
α
. (3.30)
By Proposition 2, for any A ∈ Ω(N)L and any D ∈ Ω(α)L\A we have
H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snα−1, XA) ≥ nH(Sα) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snα, XA)− nδn(α, ). (3.31)
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Substituting (3.31) into (3.30) gives
∆α−1 ≥ L L
N

 L−N
α

∑
A∈Ω(N)L
∑
D∈Ω(α)
L\A
nH(Sα) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snα, XA)− nδα(n, )
α
(3.32)
=
nL
α
H(Sα) + ∆α − nLδα(n, ). (3.33)
By the induction assumption,
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) ≥
α−1∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆α−1 −
α−1∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ) (3.34)
≥
α−1∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) +
(
nL
α
H(Sα) + ∆α − nLδα(n, )
)
−
α−1∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ) (3.35)
=
α∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆α −
α∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ). (3.36)
This completes the proof of the induction step and hence (3.23).
Finally, let α = L−N in (3.23). For any admissible rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) and
any  > 0, we have
n
L∑
l=1
(Rl + ) ≥
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) (3.37)
≥
L−N∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆L−N −
L−N∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ) (3.38)
≥
L−N∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk)−
L−N∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ) (3.39)
where (3.39) follows from the fact that ∆L−N ≥ 0. Divide both sides of (3.39) by n
23
and let n→∞ and → 0. Note that δk(n, )→ 0 in the limit as n→∞ and → 0
for all k = 1, . . . , L−N . We thus have
L∑
l=1
Rl ≥
L−N∑
k=1
L
k
H(Sk) (3.40)
for any admissible rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
This thesis considered the problem of S-SMDC, which is a natural (perhaps also the
simplest) extension of the classical SMDC problem [1–4] to the secrecy communi-
cation setting. First, the problem of encoding individual sources, i.e., the S-SSDC
problem, was studied. A precise characterization of the entire admissible rate region
was established via a connection to the problem of secure coding over a three-layer
WN [8] and utilizing some basic polyhedral structure of the admissible rate region.
Building on this result, it was then shown that the simple coding strategy of sepa-
rately encoding individual sources at the encoders (superposition coding) can achieve
the minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem.
Based on the result of Theorem 3 (and the fact that superposition coding can
achieve the entire admissible rate region for the classical SMDC problems without
secrecy constraints), it is very tempting to conjecture that superposition coding can
in fact achieve the entire admissible rate region for the general S-SMDC problem. In
Appendix B, we verify that this is indeed the case for the simplest nontrivial S-SMDC
problem: the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem. Our proof relies on an explicit characterization
of the superposition coding rate region via a Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure.
The optimality of superposition coding is then established by carefully using the
results of Proposition 2.
Extending such a proof strategy to the general (L,N) S-SMDC problem, how-
ever, faces a number of challenges. To begin with, the complexity of Fourier-Motzkin
elimination procedure grows unboundedly as the total number of encoders L increases.
Thus, establishing an explicit characterization of the superposition coding rate region
for the general (L,N) S-SMDC problem appears to be very difficult. An alternative
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strategy is to look for an implicit characterization of the superposition coding rate
region using optimal α-resolutions, similar to that [4] for the classical SMDC problem
without any secrecy constraints. In fact, note from Theorem 1 that the admissible rate
region of an (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem depends on the parameters N and m only via
its difference m−N . As mentioned previously in Sec. II, when N = 0, the (L,N,m)
S-SSDC problem reduces to the classical (L,m) SSDC problem without any secrecy
constraints. Thus, the admissible rate region of the (L,N,N + k) S-SSDC problem
with source Sk is identical to that of the classical (L, k) SSDC problem with the same
source. As a result, the superposition coding rate region of the (L,N) S-SMDC prob-
lem with sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) is identical to the superposition coding rate region
of the classical SMDC problem with a total of L encoders and sources (S1, . . . , SL)
where the entropy rate of the source H(Sl) = 0 for l = L−N+1, . . . , L. Based on this
observation, the α-resolution characterization of the superposition coding rate region
for the general SMDC problem can be directly translated to the S-SMDC problem.
It remains to see whether the properties provided in [4] on optimal α-resolutions
are sufficient for establishing the optimality of superposition coding for the general
S-SMDC problem. This problem is currently under our investigations.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let D ∈ Ω(m−N)L and let A ∈ Ω(N)L\D. Since A ∩ D = ∅, we have |D ∪ A| =
N + (m−N) = m. For any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code that satisfies both asymptotically
perfect reconstruction constraint (2.4) and the perfect secrecy constraint (2.5), we
have by Fano’s inequality
H(Sn|XD, XA) ≤ nδ(n, ) (A.1)
where
δ(n, ) = 1/n+  log |S| (A.2)
and
H(Sn|XA) = H(Sn). (A.3)
For any admissible rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) and any  > 0, we have
n
∑
l∈D
(Rl + ) ≥
∑
l∈D
H(Xl) (A.4)
≥ H (XD) (A.5)
≥ H (XD|XA) (A.6)
≥ H (XD|XA) +H (Sn|XD, XA)− nδ(n, ) (A.7)
= H (XD, S
n|XA)− nδ(n, ) (A.8)
= H (Sn|XA) +H (XD|Sn, XA)− nδ(n, ) (A.9)
≥ H (Sn|XA)− nδ(n, ) (A.10)
= H (Sn)− nδ(n, ) (A.11)
= nH(S)− nδ(n, ) (A.12)
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where (A.5) follows from the independence bound on entropy, (A.6) follows from the
fact that conditioning reduces entropy, (A.7) follows from (A.1), (A.11) follows from
(A.3), and (A.12) follows from the fact that the source S is memoryless. Divide both
sides of (A.12) by n and let n→∞ and → 0. Note that δ(n, )→ 0 in the limit as
n→∞ and → 0. We have from (A.12) that
∑
l∈D
Rl ≥ H(S), ∀D ∈ Ω(m−N)L . (A.13)
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
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APPENDIX B
THE ADMISSIBLE RATE REGION OF THE (3, 1) S-SMDC PROBLEM
In this appendix, we show that superposition coding can achieve the entire admissible
rate region for the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem (the simplest nontrivial S-SMDC problem).
The result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Superposition coding can achieve the entire admissible rate region for the
(3, 1) S-SMDC problem, which is given by the collection of all rate triples (R1, R2, R3)
satisfying
R1 ≥ H(S1)
R2 ≥ H(S1)
R3 ≥ H(S1)
R1 +R2 ≥ 2H(S1) +H(S2)
R2 +R3 ≥ 2H(S1) +H(S2)
R3 +R1 ≥ 2H(S1) +H(S2).
(B.1)
Proof. Achievability. Consider the superposition coding scheme that separately en-
codes the sources S1 and S2 using the (3, 1, 2) and (3, 1, 3) S-SSDC codes, respectively.
By Theorem 1, the admissible rate region for the (3, 1, 2) S-SSDC problem is given
by all rate triples (R
(1)
1 , R
(1)
2 , R
(1)
3 ) satisfying
R
(1)
1 ≥ H(S1)
R
(1)
2 ≥ H(S1)
R
(1)
3 ≥ H(S1)
(B.2)
and the admissible rate region for the (3, 1, 3) S-SSDC problem is given by all rate
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triples (R
(2)
1 , R
(2)
2 , R
(2)
3 ) satisfying
R
(2)
1 ≥ 0
R
(2)
2 ≥ 0
R
(2)
3 ≥ 0
R
(2)
1 +R
(2)
2 ≥ H(S2)
R
(2)
2 +R
(2)
3 ≥ H(S2)
R
(2)
3 +R
(2)
1 ≥ H(S2).
(B.3)
Following (3.7), all rate triples (R1, R2, R3) as given by
Rl = R
(1)
l +R
(2)
l , ∀l = 1, 2, 3 (B.4)
are admissible via superposition coding. Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination to elim-
inate R
(k)
l , l = 1, 2, 3 and k = 1, 2, from (B.2)–(B.4), we obtain the explicit charac-
terization of the superposition coding rate region for the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem as
expressed by (B.1).
The converse. Next, we establish the optimality of superposition coding by prov-
ing that every inequality in (B.1) must hold for all admissible rate triples (R1, R2, R3)
for the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem. Let
a⊕ b :=
 a+ b, if a+ b ≤ 3a+ b− 3, otherwise. (B.5)
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For any admissible rate triple (R1, R2, R3), any l = 1, 2, 3, and any  > 0, we have
n(Rl + ) ≥ H(Xl) (B.6)
≥ H(Xl|Xl⊕1) (B.7)
≥ nH(S1) +H(Xl|Sn1 , Xl⊕1)− nδ1(n, ) (B.8)
≥ nH(S1)− nδ1(n, ) (B.9)
and
n(Rl +Rl⊕1 + 2)
≥ H(Xl) +H(Xl⊕1) (B.10)
≥ H(Xl|Xl⊕1) +H(Xl⊕1|Xl⊕2) (B.11)
≥ 2nH(S1) +H(Xl|Sn1 , Xl⊕1) +H(Xl⊕1|Sn1 , Xl⊕2)− 2nδ1(n, ) (B.12)
≥ 2nH(S1) +H(Xl|Sn1 , Xl⊕1, Xl⊕2) +H(Xl⊕1|Sn1 , Xl⊕2)
−2nδ1(n, ) (B.13)
= 2nH(S1) +H(Xl, Xl⊕1|Sn1 , Xl⊕2)− 2nδ1(n, ) (B.14)
≥ 2nH(S1) + (nH(S2) +H(Xl, Xl⊕1|Sn1 , Sn2 , Xl⊕2)− nδ2(n, ))
−2nδ1(n, ) (B.15)
≥ 2nH(S1) + nH(S2)− nδ2(n, )− 2nδ1(n, ). (B.16)
Here, (B.7), (B.11) and (B.13) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy,
and (B.8), (B.12) and (B.15) follow from Proposition 2. Dividing both sides of (B.9)
and (B.16) by n and letting n → ∞ and  → 0 complete the proof of the converse
part of the theorem.
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